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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sweet and Foreman were romantically involved when SS was born of their relationship 
on December 16, 2005. R Vol. I, p. 159, L. 14. Child support was initiated by the Idaho 
Department of Child Support Services on March 20, 2006, under Boundary County Case No. 
CV-2006-118. Foreman moved into Sweet's home on July 2, 2006, with SS and her other child 
of a prior relationship. R Vol. I, p. 159, LL 18-20. Foreman told Sweet that he would not have 
to pay child support because they were living together and sharing expenses. R Vol. I, p. 163 
LI. 3-5. 
Default judgment was entered by the court on August 9, 2006, ordering Sweet to pay 
child support in the amount of $454.00 per month beginning March 1, 2006, birth costs in the 
amount of $767.00, and attorney fees in the amount of $330.00. Paternit and Child Support 
Jud ent and Order 08/08/2006 Case No. CV-2006-118.i The State provided no information 
supporting the child support calculations. Id. Sweet was employed as a logger and as a farmer. 
Tr 6/7/12, p. 75 LL 21-23, p. 106 LI. 3--4. The economy was beginning its downturn, which has 
inordinately affected family farms and the local logging industry in the Pacific Northwest. Tr 
6/7/12, p. 110 LL 13-18. 
In December of 2006, Foreman accompanied Sweet to the office of Child Support 
Services in Coeur d'Alene, and signed a waiver of child support. R Vol. I, p. 163 LL 4-5. At 
that time, he was informed by Child Support Services that his obligation was zero dollars as a 
result of the waiver. R Vol. I, p. 163, LL 19-20. However, the amount continued to accrue. 
unknown to Sweet. R Vol. I, p. 163 LI. 17-21. In March of 2008. Foreman took SS to 
Counsel will move the court to augment the record with a copy of the paternity order entered in the related and 
now consoiidated support proceeding Boundary County Case. No.CV-2006-118. 
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California. and requested the Department to collect the arrearages, by this time in the amount of 
$9080.00. Tr 6/7/12, p. 42 LL 9-23. The State suspended Sweet's commercial driver's license, 
further reducing his employment income. Tr 6/7/12 p. 109 LL 9-13. Sweet filed a motion to 
modify custody and child support on April L 2008. R Vol. I p. 160 LL 11-12. He was unable 
to continue making payments on the house that Foreman had lived in, and the property went into 
foreclosure. Tr 6/7/12, p. 109, LL 2-4. 
The Order of Child Custody of June 16, 2008 did not address child support. Foreman 
was the primary custodian, but if she left town, Sweet could care for SS. R Vol. l, p. 55. This 
provision was not followed; Sweet obtained temporary custody February 4, 2010, after SS was 
found, with soiled clothes and his shoes on backwards, aione on a busy Spokane street. Police 
report.2• Foreman was working in Yakima. Washington, at the time. Id. 
Both parties filed custody modification petitions, and on March 9, 2010, Sweet filed a 
renewed petition to amend the arrearage and to modify child support nunc pro tune. R Vol. I, p. 
161, LI. 3-5. Following mediation, the court entered a custody order pursuant to the stipulation 
of the parties, October 1, 2010. Order Regardi g Child Custody and Visitation 10/1/10.3 Eight 
months later, Foreman filed another petition to modify custody. R Vol. I p. 110. Trial was held 
June 7, 2012, and continued to August 8, 2012. R Vol. I p. 126. The court ruled in open court 
on the custody issue, and ordered the parties to brief the child support and other financial issues. 
R Vol. I, p. 127. Foreman was charged with preparation of the order denying her petition to 
modify, which was filed October 4, 2012. R Vol. I p. 149. 
Foreman filed a motion to reconsider October 18, 2012. R Vol. I, p. 156. On October 
23, 2012, the court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: A11 Pending Financial 
Issues and Child Support, ordering Foreman's attorney to calculate and prepare the final child 
support order. R Vol. I, p. 158. However, this was not done. On December 4, 2012, Foreman's 
2 
Sweet will move to augment the record with a copy of the police report which was admitted into evidence at the 
hearing of February 4, 20!0. 
3 
Sweet will move to augment the record with a copy of the 1011/l0 custody order. 
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motion to reconsider was denied, and the court again asked for the calculations to be completed. 
R Vol. I, p. 171. On January 11, 2013, Foreman appealed. R Vol. I p. 174. The Order 
Regarding Child Support and Financial Issues was filed after hearing on January 15, 2013. R 
Vol. I, p. 177. On January 30, 2013, Sweet filed a motion for an award of attorney fees. R Vol. L 
p., 184, and a motion to reconsider, R Vol I, p. 186. Both were treated as motions to reconsider 
and denied March 25, 2013. Tr 3/25/13, p. 25, LL 4-8. Sweet cross-appealed March 28, 2013. 
R Vol. I, p. 194. 
On appeal, the district court affirmed all of the magistrate's orders and denied attorney 
fees to either party. Sweet appeals against the district coun's affirmation of the magistrate's 
findings and conclusions as to the respective incomes of the parties, as to the provision requiring 
Sweet to pay Foreman's mileage, and against the magistrate's denial of attorney fees pursuant to 
1.C. §12-121 or pursuant to LC. §12-123. Sweet further requests attorney fees on this appeal, 
pursuant to I. C. § 12-12 J. 
ISSUES OF FACT 
1. At hearing on Sweet's motion to reconsider, the court held that the parties did not 
stipulate to Sweet's income being set at $25,000.00. Tr 3/25/13 p. 11 LL 12-13. 
2. At hearing on Sweet's motion to reconsider, the court held that Sweet stipulated that he 
was underemployed. Tr 3/25/2013 p. 16, L. 3. 
3. The court believed Foreman suffered an increase m mileage when it required the 
receiving party to make the full drive both ways, instead of both parents meeting half-way. Tr 
8/8/2012, p.203 LL 2-20. 
4. The court held that Sweet's income should be imputed at $30,000.00 a year. Tr 
3/25/2013, p. 16, LL 10-12. 
5. The court held that Foreman was not underemployed, and that her guidelines income was 
$50,000.00 a year. R Vol. I, p. 178 LI. 14-15. 
LEGAL ISSUES 
1. Did the court err in setting Sweet's income at S30,000.00 when he stipulated to the 
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amount of S25,000.00 as his annual income? 
a. Did the court abuse its discretion when it determined that Sweet was voluntarily 
underemployed? 
b. Was Sweet's potential income a proper subject for judicial notice? 
2. Did the court err in not finding Foreman voluntarily unemployed? 
3. Did the magistrate err when it decided the change would result in increased driving 
distance and unfairness to Ms. Foreman, and ordered Sweet to pay half her mileage? 
a. Foreman's driving distance did not change. 
b. The requirement that Sweet pay Foreman's mileage amounts to a summary sanction 
for contempt of court, without due process. 
c. Evidence shows that Foreman was responsible for most of the difficulties at the 
exchanges. 
4. Was it an abuse of discretion not to award attorney fees pursuant to I.e. §12-121, 
where Foreman's denial of her waiver of child support was not based in fact or in law, and 
where Sweet spent thousands trying to prove he did not owe the arrears? 
5. Was it an abuse of discretion not to award attorney fees pursuant to I.e. §12-123, 
where Foreman's request that the Department of Health and Welfare collect child support 
arrears was malicious and intended to harass or harm Sweet, and where her denial, for five 
years, of the waiver, was not based in fact or in law, and did in fact seriously harm and 
impair Sweet's ability to earn an income? 
6. Should the court award attorney fees to Sweet pursuant to I.e.§ 12-121 on appeal? 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
lbe decision of the trial court on a motion to modify child support is reviewed on appeal 
for an abuse of discretion. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 23, 25, 855 P.2d 484, 486 (Id.App. 
1993). The decision of whether or not to award attorney fees is also reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760. When the district 
court has acted in an appellate capacity and a further appeal is taken, the Supreme Court 
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independently reviews the complete record before the magistrate, but with due regard for the 
district court's decision. Keeler v. Keeler, 131 Idaho 442. 444, 958 P.2d 599, 602 (Ct.App. 
1998). The magistrate's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Id. Findings supported by substantial and competent evidence are not clearly 
erroneous. Id. Where the trial court is the ultimate finder of fact, the appellate court liberally 
construes the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Kornfield v. 
Kornfield, 134 ldaho 383,385, 3 P.3d 61, 63 (Id.App. 2000). 
The reviewing court looks to see (I) whether the trial correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently wiih the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. S Valle· Shopping Center Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). However, the Supreme Court exercises free review 
over questions of law; State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 387, 195 P.3d 745, 746 (Idaho App. 2008), 
(review of the authority of a court to take judicial notice); Kornfield. supra (the interpretation of 
the I.C.S.G. is a question oflaw.) 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
1. Did the court err in setting Sweet's income at $30,000.00 when be stipulated to the 
amount of S25,000.00 as his annual income? 
Evidence shows that Sweet was employed as a logger, which is seasonal employment, 
owned his own salad dressing business, and worked on his family's farm. Tr 6/7/12, p. 106 LI. 2-
4; p.110, LI. 22-24; p. 75 LI. 18-23. His tax returns reflected losses due to the downturn in the 
economy. Tr 6/7/12 p. 22, LL 10-16. Sweet stipulated that his annual income should be set at 
the amount of $25,000.00 for the purpose of calculating child support. That amount was used by 
both parties when the parties submitted their post-trial briefs on the matter. The magistrate, sua 
sponte, held that Sweet's annual income shouJd be set at $30,000.00. On review, the district 
court noted that it was Sweet's testimony that he could make $25,000.00 a year at a job other 
than farming. This is very different from stipulating that he was underemployed. The Idaho 
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Child Support Guidelines do not inquire whether a parent could make more money if he were 
employed differently. The state does not tell parents what employment they should seek. 
a) Did the court abuse its discretion when it determined that Sweet was voluntarily 
underemployed? 
Voluntary unemployment or underemployment results when a parent quits a well-paying 
job, and takes a lower-paying job, or none at all. The statute bars a finding of underemployment 
when a parent already works full-time in his traditional field. Otherwise, the government could 
find itself forcing parents to pursue whatever employment the magistrate deems most lucrative or 
beneficial for the child. The law does not go so far. 
Idaho Child Support Guidelines give specific guidance for evaluating evidence in child 
support proceedings. Rule (c)(6) Sec. 1. A parent shall not be deemed underemployed if 
gainfully employed on a full-time basis at the same or similar occupation in which he/she was 
employed for more than six month before the filing of the action or separation of the parties, 
whichever occurs first. Rule (c)(6) Sec. (c){l ). In this case, it was Sweet's uncontroverted 
testimony that he lost his commercial driver's license when Foreman decided to demand the child 
support that she had originally waived. Tr 6/7 /l 2, p. 109 LL 2-22. Sweet was gainfully 
employed as a logger and as a tanner, for more than six months before the filing of the action. or 
the separation of the parties. He continues to work in those occupations, although no longer as a 
commercial driver due to the loss of that opportunity after Foreman attempted to collect the 
alleged arrears. Id. It was clearly erroneous for the magistrate to deem Sweet voluntarily 
underemployed. 
If a parent has assets that do not currently produce income, or that have been voluntarily 
transferred or placed in a condition or situation to reduce earnings, the court may attribute 
reasonable monetary value of income to the assets so that an adequate award of child support 
may be made. Rule {c){6) Sec. (c)(2}. Although he was employed foll time, Sweet's business 
and farm income produced a loss on his tax records. There was no evidence that Sweet's assets 
do not currently produce income. or that they were transferred, voluntarily or otherwise. or 
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placed in a condition or situation to reduce earnings. Finally, Foreman did not request or present 
any evidence regarding the reasonable monetary value of income of any specific assets and the 
magistrate did not make any findings in that regard. 
At hearing on Sweet's motion to reconsider, the magistrate held that the parties did not 
stipulate to Sweet's income being set at $25,000.00. Tr 3/25/13, p. i 6, LI. 12-13. The magistrate 
also found that, at trial, Sweet stipulated that he was underemployed. Tr 3/25/13 p. 16, LL 2-4. 
The trial court erred; both parties used Sweet's voluntary figure of $25,000.00 a year for their 
post-trial arguments, no evidence was presented that he did not work full time. and no other 
figure was advanced or supported by either party. Sweet testified that he arrived at the figure 
because it was the amount that he might otherwise have earned if he wasn't a farmer. Tr 6/7/12, 
p. 75 LL 10-14. He did not testify that he agreed that he should work at such other employment, 
only that it was the basis for the figure he offered. 
The district court should have found that the magistrate did not have discretion, and it 
was clear error, to decide that Sweet was underemployed when he was working full time at his 
traditional occupation. 
b) Was Sweet's potential income a proper subject for judicial notice? 
The court pointed out that Mr. Sweet, " ... stipulated, readily, that he could make 
$25.000.00 if he chose to do other things that are available." Tr 3/25/13, p. 16 LL 5-6. The 
magistrate further stated, "I know what a man is worth in this community, I live in this 
community, I know what Mr. Sweet is capable of. If he wanted to make $30,000.00 and not do 
the fanning in exchange for that. he could. And I'm going to stand with that. I might get 
reversed. I fully recognize that, because the evidence was not well put forward by Ms. Foreman 
on Mr. Sweet's potential income." Tr 3/25/13, p. 16 LL 9-14. 
The magistrate did not have any evidence supporting the finding that Sweet could have 
earned $30,000 a year. Such evidence would have to be presented by a neutral witness, subject 
to cross-examination and impeachment. The magistrate should not have such personal 
knowledge of matters to be proven at trial; the court should only consider the evidence presented 
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in court. The district court should have found that the magistrate was acting outside of its 
authority, did not comply with the applicable legal standards, and abused its discretion when it 
determined, sua sponte, that Sweet's income should be $30,000.00 a year. 
Judicial notice is governed by Rule 20 I of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which states in 
relevant part, as follows: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either ( 1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
I.R.E. 201. In this case. the community is not charged with knowledge of the skills and 
opportunities of its residents. The amount of income a given individual might be able to earn is 
not a matter that is generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, nor is it 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned. In Brazier v. Brazier, the Appellate Court noted that, "the parties 
offered no evidence regarding the likely evolution of the children's needs or parental resources. 
Rather, the magistrate, acting sua sponte, stated in his memorandum decision that "[a]s [the 
children] reach their teenage years it will undoubtedly become more expensive to maintain them 
regardless of inflation." Brazier v. Brazier, 111 Idaho 692, 700, 726 P.2d I 144 (Ct.App. 1986). 
Similarly in this case. judicial notice was not taken until the court issued its Memorandum 
Opinion and Order Re: All Pending Financial Issues and Child Support, wherein it acted sua 
sponte in its determination that Sweet earned more than the figure he stipulated could be used. 
The Supreme Court held that judicial notice was not appropriate: 
... the "fact" allegedly noticed by the magistrate is plausible. but we are not 
prepared to say that it would be beyond dispute in every case. Neither do we find 
in the magistrate's memorandwn decision any nexus between the general "fact" of 
increased cost and the particular adjustment of $100 per month ordered in the 
decree. [3] Idaho Code § 32-706 requires an individualized determination 
regarding the needs of children and the resources of parents. A magistrate's 
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general perception of increased cost will not suffice. 
Id. Similarly in this case, Sweets skills and abilities, and his employment opportunities, are not 
proper subjects for judiciai notice because these are disputable facts requiring to be proved. 
The rule on judicial notice goes on to require that a party is entitled to an opportunity to 
be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the 
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
I.R.E. 201 ( e ). Sweet was not afforded the opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking 
judicial notice, or as to the tenor of the matter noticed, and he was not afforded the opportunity to 
present evidence in opposition to the court's factual determination. 
Absent notice and an opportunity to be heard, it was an abuse of the court's discretion to 
take judicial notice of Sweet's talents and abilities in order to suport his ruling that Sweet's 
income was greater than the parties had both employed in their briefs. The magistrate cannot 
testify, even if he had actual knowledge, as to the employment opportunities that might be 
available to Sweet had he chosen a different profession. 
On review, the district court noted the following: "Phillip testified he has been employed 
as a logger, owns 40 to 60 acres of farm property in Idaho, has a rental unit on the Idaho property 
and one-half ownership in another rental unit near Twin Rivers Resort in Idaho, owns a four-unit 
apartment complex in Spokane, Washington, that he rents out three of the units and keeps one for 
himself, and he makes and sells a line of salad dressings." R Vol. II, p. 293 LL 7-12. 
The district court's summary of Sweet's testimony is mistaken, and simply adding 
$500.00 a month to Sweet's imputed income to compensate for the empty unit is deeply flawed 
in that it (a) presumes a 100% occupancy rate: (b) presumes that such rental could be provided at 
no additional expense; and (c) adds the additional income to the $25,000.00 figure provided by 
Sweet. rather than to Sweet's actuai income. 
Sweet testified that he owned some property on the farm, not the entire farm itself. Tr 
6/7/12, p.75 L. 16. Sweet testified that most of the farm income went to his parents. Tr 6/7/12, 
p. 78 L. 11. Sweet testified that his parents sold hay to third parties, that he only used the hay to 
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feed his cows, and that he receives his income through the sale of the cattle. Tr 6/7 / l 2, p. 78 LL 
14-22. Sweet aiso testified that a trailer located on the farm property rented out for $400.00 a 
month, but not that he himself received that income. Tr 6/7/12, p.77 LI. 21-25; p. 78 LL 10-11. 
Sweet testified that he owned a four-unit apartment building in Spokane, and that he 
usually has between two and three rented, bringing in between $1000.00 to $1,500.00. He also 
testified that he let Rebecca stay in one unit, which he normally keeps for his own use. Sweet 
testified that his mortgage payment is $1,200.00 a month, and that he pays utilities in the amount 
of$300.00 to $500.00 a month. Tr 6/7/12, p. 77 LI. 2-10. 
As for the rental unit near the Twin Rivers Resort. Sweet testified that he merely owned a 
remainder interest as a will substitute, that his mother retained the life estate, and that, when it is 
rented out, his mother receives all the income. Tr 6/7/12, p.79 LL 1-13. 
Regarding the salad dressing business, Sweet testified that he rented the building from his 
parents for $500.00 a month, that he sold salad dressing to Harvest Foods. the Pizza Factory, and 
Yokes, that his gross income from sales amounted to about $500.00 a month, and that all his 
income was reported on his taxes. Tr 6/7/12. p.79 LL 14-25, p. 80 LL 1-4. 
As noted by the district court, the resulting annual income reported on Sweet's tax return 
was negative $5,000.00. Foreman bore the burden of proof if she wished to dispute that amount. 
The extra income that might be available through renting an apartment unit would have to be 
added to the negative $5,000.00. She would have to come up with $30,000.00 of potential 
income to arrive at the $25,000.00 figure to which Sweet stipulated. 
Expert testimony regarding farming and logging employment statistics, including the 
average income earned by full-time laborers in each of those occupations, after deducting 
reasonable costs and expenses for tools and/or equipment, including depreciation, might have 
proved that Sweet's potential income was far less than the amount to which he stipulated. Since 
Sweet lives on the family farm, and shares many of the benefits enjoyed by his parents, and in 
order to save himself and the court the time, trouble, and expense of protracted proceedings on 
the topic, Sweet generously stipulated that he would agree to an imputed income of $25,000.00. 
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As a result. Foreman did not have to prove that Sweet earned $25.000.00 a year: she coma noL 
and did not, prove that Sweet earned a pennv over that amount. 
The magistrate conceded that, '' ... [T]here was no vocational expert who came m and 
looked at Mr. Sweet's skills and his work history and his experience and gave the Court the kind 
of testimony it would like to see in terms of identifying other local jobs that Mr. Sweet would be 
qualified for and could get, that paid X amount of dollars. I mean, that's the way we would like 
to see those sorts of things proven up." Tr 3/25/13 p. 15, LL 2i-25; p. 16, LL 1-2. The matter of 
which the court took judicial notice must be proven through the testimony of expert vocational 
witness who could make a proper inquiry into Sweet's talents and abilities, and inform the court 
of its opinion. Sweet would have been on notice of the evidence before the court, and would 
have had the opportunity to refute it, and to present his o\\n witnesses and account of the matter. 
None of this occurred. 
The district court should have found that the magistrate did not act within the outer 
boundaries of his discretion, did not apply the correct legal standards, and did not arrive at his 
conclusion via an exercise of reason. It was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to state that 
he had personal knowledge of Sweet's skills and abilities, and of the employment opportunities 
available to Sweet in the community, and to take judicial notice of his own opinion regarding 
Sweet's potential income. 
2. Did the court err in not finding Foreman voluntarily unemployed? 
The magistrate declined to impute an income to Foreman. although the evidence shows 
that she only worked twenty to thirty hours a week. down from her original full-time 
employment as a registered nurse. Tr 8/8/12 p. 67, Ll.21-22. The court stated that Sweet 
should have introduced vocational testimony that Foreman could obtain forty hours a week 
employment. Tr 3/25/2013 p. 18 LL 5 and 6. However, at hearing on one of several motions to 
compel, the court ordered Foreman to provide her income and employment information, and the 
order stated that, if she failed to do so. the court would impute her income at S 120,000.00. Order 
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compelling discove , and vacating trial 8/15/11.4 Almost one year later, Sweet was blindsided 
by the information, long after the time for discovery was past, that Foreman was no longer 
working for the National Guard, and that she intended to go to school, now only employed part-
time as a critical care nurse at Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, Washington. Tr 
6/17/2012 p. 96 LL 1-5. Sweet did not have the time or the opportunity to prepare and present 
expert witness testimony as to Foreman's employment opportunities, and where the need for such 
evidence was not apparent due to Foreman's failure to disclose the facts as ordered by the court. 
Tr 6/7/2012, p. 97 LL 18-22. 
It was a matter of record that Foreman worked full time when the 10/1/10 custody order 
was stipulated by the parties and entered into the record by the court. Order Regarding Child 
Custody and Visitation 10/1/10, p. 1-2. Foreman's income averaged $75,000.00 for five years. 
Her hourly wage as a nurse was $35.00 an hour, or $70,000.00 a year. Foreman was also 
employed with the National Guard, which bolstered her income. Tr 6i7i12 p.90 LL 19-25. 
Foreman voluntarily reduced her employment with the intention of going to school. As noted by 
the district court, ''she is currently enrolled in school and works part time." R Vol. 11. p. 294 L. 
~-
Therefore, the magistrate should have found that Foreman was underemployed, because 
she is working part time, and her income should be imputed at $70,000.00, the amount she would 
earn working full-time as a nurse, or at $75,000.00, the average amount that she earned working 
part-time as a nurse while also enlisted in the National Guard. 
The magistrate stated: "You're assuming there's employment out there in her specialized 
field, where she can work five days a week. I don't know that. In a lot of professions that's what 
you get, is about a three day a week shift." Tr 3/25/2013, p.17. LL 12-15. Foreman.'s full-time 
employment as a critical care nurse is a matter of record. A parent cannot avoid paying child 
support by the simple expedient of attending school. Foreman cannot o~ject to the lack of expert 
4 Sweet will move to augment the record with the order compelling discovery. 
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testimony on a subject that was not timely disclosed prior to trial. Foreman's hourly rate of 
$35.00 an hour was a matter of record, and it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate not to 
impute her yearly income in the amount of $70,000.00 a year. 
The district court should have found clear error, where it is obvious that Foreman has 
deliberately and voluntarily reduced her income: and, the district court should have found abuse 
of discretion, where the I.C.S.G. do not authorize reduction of a parent's obligation to support his 
or her child for personal educational goals. 
3. Did the magistrate err when it decided the change would result in increased driving 
distance and unfairness to Ms. Foreman, and ordered Sweet to pay half her mileage? 
The magistrate would not hear any argument or evidence in support of Sweet's motion to 
reconsider the provision that he pay half of Foreman's travel expense. ~
16. However, the finding that Rebecca Foreman suffered an increase in driving distance to pick 
up SS is dearly erroneous and should have been reversed by the district court. 
a) Foreman's driving distance did not change. 
The October 1, 2010 custody order required both parties to travel half-way, and meet at 
the Priest River police station. Order Rec,arding Custody and Visitation 10/1/10 p.4, LL 2-5. 
The magistrate changed this provision. The new order has transfers taking place at the police 
station nearest the other parent's home. R Vol. I, p. 151 LL 19-24. The mileage has not 
changed, since both parents are still required to drive an equal distance. (Both parents used to 
drive half the distance every time. Now, each parent drives the entire distance when it is his or 
her turn to pick the child up, that is every other time, or half as often. The distance each parent 
drives is unchanged.) However, the magistrate appears to believe that the change resulted in a 
net benefit to Sweet: "I've obviously, given this a bit of thought and recognize the distance and 
unfairness to Ms. Foreman." Tr 8/8/12, p. 203, LI. 1-3. The district court was equally mistaken: 
''The cost of travel for exchanges remains equally shared. Now, rather than Phillip making the 
drive, he must reimburse Rebecca for her cost to drive the extra distance." R Vol. II. p. 291 LL 
5-6. 
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The court may make equitable compensation where travel expense can be an unjust 
burden imposed upon one party by the other's move. In this case, Foreman is the parent who left 
Bonner's Ferry, creating the distance between the parties. Sweet has not moved. and it would be 
equitable for Foreman to pay the travel cost. Furthermore, Foreman's actual income from her 
part-time job is twice Sweet's imputed income. Any equitable adjustment should reasonably 
operate to relieve the iess affluent parent from the financial burden created by the more affluent 
parent. It is inequitable for the court to compensate Foreman for half her mileage where she is 
the one who moved away, the parties have always driven an equal distance, and the new order 
did not increase the driving distance for either party. The district court should have reversed the 
requirement that Sweet reimburse Foreman for her mileage. 
b) The requirement that Sweet pay Foreman's mileage amounts to a summary sanction 
for contempt of court, without due process. 
The court explained its ruling in open court as follows: "Because he cannot be trusted, by 
his own admission as well as the history established in this case. he is paying for the fact that she 
has to travel from that halfway point in Priest River up to Bonner's and then back to that halfway 
point, which she shouldn't have to do, if he were doing his part. So he's paying for that, and he's 
paying for it at the state rate, which is currently 55 cents per mile." Tr 8/8/12, p. 203 LL 16-21. 
The magistrate found that Sweet was responsible for the majority of the difliculties 
surrounding the transfers between the parties. At trial, the magistrate directed counsel: "What 
the Court is extremely concerned about in this case is the number and the duration and the 
frequency of times with which Ms. Foreman has testified to events where she was denied her 
scheduled visitation. ·where pickups. drop offs, were not done on time. Where ihe allegation is 
that Mr. Sweet would unilaterally change the place of the drop off and the time and basically say 
take it or leave it. Things of that nature are extremely concerning to the Court, and so I would 
encourage you to spend your time focusing on that and ignoring these other non-issues that I've 
identified as being real)y not, particularly, relevant from the Court's perspective." (Emphasis 
added.) Tr 8/8/2012 p. 84 LL 16-24. At the commencement of Sweet's direct testimony, the 
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magistrate reiterated: " ... obviously his attorney wili want to walk him through each of these 
events so I can get his side of the story." Tr 8/8/2012, p. 129, LI. 4-6. However, at the 
conclusion of the trial, the magistrate ruled that Sweet did not, at any particular time, unilaterally 
deny any of Ms. Foreman's mandatory parenting time. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 202, LL 1-2. 
Sweet did not change the time or place of drop off. Sweet testified that, due to weather, 
and to SS' school schedule, he could not make it from Bonner's Ferry to Priest River on 
Thursdays by 5:00 o'clock p.m.5 The parties had made various different arrangements in light of 
that reality, including Sweet driving extra distance to accommodate Foreman. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 
156, LL 23-25· p.157, LL 1-11; p.158, LL 6-13. 
Although the court did not state that it found Sweet in contempt of court, it visited a 
punishment upon him, because "he cannot be trusted" and "he's paying for that". The United 
States Supreme Court defined the difference between a civil and a criminal sanction: "An 
unconditional penalty is criminal in nature" and ''fa] conditional penalty .. .is civil'' Hicks v. 
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988). An inequitable remedy provided to one party at the expense 
of the other, without any opportunity for cure amounts to criminal sanction. It is an abuse of 
discretion to award such a sanction without due process. notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
At no time did the magistrate warn Sweet that sanctions were being considered. The court made 
it clear that custody of SS depended upon Sweet providing satisfactory answers to Foreman's 
allegations; the court directed counsel to address specific dates, indicating that any omission 
would be treated as an admission. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 150, LL 16-20. 
Foreman did not request the sanction imposed by the court, and Sweet did not have notice 
that it was being considered. There is no authority or precedence permitting the court to 
substitute a criminal proceeding for a civil hearing, without notice or opportunity to be heard, 
and then impose a criminal sanction. Sweet should have had the right to be informed that the 
charge could carry criminal penalties, to present defenses and cross-examine witnesses, and to be 
5 
Boundary County schools do not have class on Friday; the long weekend "A" began on Thursday night 
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advised of the right not to incriminate himself. Foreman should have had to prove her case 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
The district court should have reviewed de novo the magistrate's application of the legal 
standard, and determined that it was an abuse of the court's discretion. The portion of the 
custody order requiring Sweet to pay Foreman's mileage should be vacated. 
c) Evidence shows that Foreman was responsible for most of the difficulties at the 
exchanges. 
Even if the court had given Sweet notice and an opportunity to defend against the 
charges, there was not substantial evidence supporting the allegation that Sweet was the primary 
cause of the difficulties between the parties. There was substantial evidence that Foreman's 
interpretation of the custody order, refusal to comply with "floating weekend'' requests, and her 
insistence that every week was her long weekend "A", were the most prevailing reasons for the 
conflict between the parties. The custody order itself contained a variety of flexible provisions 
designed to allow Foreman a maximum amount of time with SS "so long as Mother is not 
working". Order Regarding Custody and Visitation dated 10/1/2010, p. 1-2. If Foreman 
changed her work schedule, her parenting time changed, and Sweet would drive to Spokane to 
get SS back to Bonner's Ferry. When Foreman was free to spend time with SS, an exchange 
would again take place. If there was a dispute as to the meaning of the order, the police would 
be involved, and the order would be enforced subject to the officer's interpretation. 
Other than Sweet's admitted tardiness on Thursdays. allegations that Sweet was at fault 
in the exchanges were dismissed by Foreman or proven false, due to a) the parties' making 
alternate arrangements, b) the dispute between the parties concerning Sweet's "floating 
weekends", or. c) the dispute between the parties concerning whether it was ''week A" (her long 
weekend), or "week B" (one night). On one occasion Foreman took SS from Sweet's home, and 
was forced to return him by the police. Tr. 8/8/2012 p. 138, LL 3-10. 
Because Sweet only had one monthly weekend with SS, the parties agreed that Sweet 
could have four "floating weekends" throughout the year. Since Boundary County schools 
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operate on a four-day school-week, in a strained interpretation of the ''floating weekend'' 
provision, Foreman insisted that she shouid have SS Thursday night and return SS to Sweet for 
the "floating weekend" on Friday. Tr. 8/8/2012 p.177, LL 22-25; p.178 LI. 9-16. 
Sweet testified that he kept SS pursuant to the custody order December 15, 2010, because 
Foreman was working. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 130, LI. 1-7. December 15. 2010, was a Wednesday. 
Foreman complains she did not get SS on the 15th, then states that December 16. '' ... was my 
scheduled time for my normal pick-up ... " Tr 8/8/2012, p. 86, LI. 5-10. This is another case of 
confusion over the custody order. 
March 3, 2011, was the first weekend of the month, and pursuant to the court order SS 
was supposed to remain with Sweet. Foreman complains because Sweet delivered SS to her at 
10:30 at night, as an accommodation to her because he was going to be out of town. Tr 
8/8/2012, p. 53, LI. 16-18. 
March 8, 2011, was a Thursday. Foreman testified that this was her scheduled time for 
her to have SS. At trial. Foreman used the ''Memoranda" prepared by her attorney to refresh her 
memory, but doesn't remember anything it does not say: "I don't remember if he had actually 
dropped him off or not, it doesn't say, but he refused to talk to me and kept putting SS on the 
phone or put SS in the middle of it, which he's not supposed to be doing.'' Tr 8/8/2012, p. 40, LI. 
5-7. Sweet testified that the parties bad agreed to a later time, that there was "no set time" on 
Thursday, because "it says five o'clock on the decree and I cannot make it a five o'clock because 
SS gets off the school bus at four thirty." Tr 8/8/2012, p. 157, LL 6-8. 
In April 2011, pursuant to the custody order. Sweet had SS the first weekend of every 
month. Sweet testified that Foreman was in Hawaii from April 8 until the 22nd of April, and that 
she gave him no advance notice when she would return. Tr 8/8/2012 p. 131 LL 21-25· p. 132 
LI. 1-6· p. 133. LL 12-19· p. 135, LL 5-20. Sweet testified that, before they knew when Foreman 
would be back, had planned Easter egg hunts for the next day; Foreman called late on the 
22nd, and Sweet told her that she could come join SS at the community evenL and take him from 
there. Tr 8/8/20 I 2, p. 136, LL 1-8. This amounts to a change of circumstances resulting from 
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Foreman's travel in Hawaii. It is not a violation of the custody order. October 6, 2011. was 
a Thursday, again a "B" week. Foreman was supposed to have SS Friday morning. According 
to Foreman's testimony, Sweet allowed her to pick SS up anyway, but she complains because he 
did not drive SS to Priest River, which he was not obligated to do. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 44 LL 5-7. 
Foreman complains that she had to pick SS up at Walmart; Sweet drove an extra half-hour so 
that she could pick SS up in Sandpoint instead of driving all the way to Bonner's Ferry. Tr 
8/8/2012, p. 139, LI. 5-25. According to Sweet's testimony, he was on time and she was not. Tr 
8/8/2012, p. 138, LL 23-24. 
October 13, 2011, the Memoranda states that Sweet "didn't show up'\ however Foreman 
testified that Sweet called and told her he would not be able to make it on time, indicative of 
unusual circumstances. Tr 8/8/2012 p. 44 LL 16-18. Sweet testified that he attempted to work 
out an alternative arrangement that decreased her driving time, by delivering SS to Post Falls 
instead of Priest River. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 140 LL 4-15. 
October 27, 2011, was a Thursday. again a "B" week, pick up was on Saturday. Foreman 
complains that she did not get SS on Thursday pursuant to the "A" week schedule. Tr 8/8/2012. 
p. 44, LL 19-25. 
November 11, 2011 was supposed to be a "floating weekend" but Foreman refused to 
deliver SS. Sweet testified as to his plans for that time, and that Foreman finally brought SS for 
a two-hour visit. Tr 8/8/2012 p. 163, LL 9-16. 
December 8, 2011 was a "floating weekend". Tr. 8/8/2012 p. 140, LL 21-25. 
December 16. 2011 was the beginning of Christmas break, to Sweet in odd years. Order 
January 19, 2012, was a week "B", Foreman complains she did not receive SS on 
Thursday. while the court order required the exchange take place on Saturday morning. 
February 16, 2012, Foreman believed it was an ''A" week, transfer on Thursday, Sweet 
believed it was a "B'' week, transfer on Saturday, both were wrong; it was President's Day 
weekend, transfer on Friday. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 154. LL 11-17. 
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February 23, 2012, Sweet testified that the police became involved in the custody 
confusion and told him it was week "B". Foreman testified that he informed her of the same. Tr 
8/8/2012 p. 50, LL 17-20. SS was delivered Saturday. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 51, LL 5-6. 
March 8 and 29, 2012, were "B" weeks, however SS was delivered on Thursday. albeit 
late. as an accomodation. Tr 8/8/20 l 2 p. 51, LL 18-23. Sweet testified that he was delayed by 
the weather and road construction on the Dover Bridge, and that the parties had agreed to change 
the times. Tr 8/8/2012 p. 156 LI. 23-25; p. 157, LL 6-8; p. 158 LL 6-10, 17-20. 
Foreman dropped her allegations regarding April 19, 2012. Tr 8/8/2012, p. 158, LL 23-
~-
Sweet testified that Foreman would always argue that it was week "A", or that the 
schedule did not apply because she said that she was not working. Tr. 8/8/2012,p. 130, LL I 1-
17. He testified that he often allowed Foreman to have SS during his custodial time, when she 
wasn't working. Tr. 8/8/2012 p. 131, LL 4-11. Sweet also testified that Foreman did not follow 
the "floating weekend" provision. Tr. 8/8/2012 . 163 LI. 1 -24 
The Court should note the evidentiary dispute at the end of the trial on August 8, 2012. 
Foreman introduced a packet of texts as evidence. which were admitted over Sweet's objection. 
Tr. 8/8/2012 p. 193, LL 11-19. One of the texts proved that, contrary to Foreman's assertion, 
Sweet had requested a floating weekend for December 29, 2011, however that particular text was 
omitted from the batch that was admitted into evidence. Tr. 8/8/2012 p.193, LL 5-23; p. 194, LI. 
1-5. Sweet was not aware of the omission until informed by counsel for Foreman. Tr. 8/8/2012 
~- The court would not allow Sweet to correct the omission, however the text 
would have shown that Sweet requested the weekend. Tr. 8/8/2012 p. 194 LL 1-5. 
Although Sweet admitted to being late at exchanges on Thursdays due to weather, there 
was substantial evidence that Foreman's interpretation of the custody order. refusal to comply 
with "floating weekend'' requests, and her insistence that every week was her Jong weekend, 
were the most prevailing reasons for the conflict between the parties. The magistrate 
commenced by noting that very fact on the record in his ruling on the custody issue; Foreman 
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denied Sweet two weekends that should have been his parenting time with SS. Tr. 8/8/2012, ~-
201. LL 18-25. The magistrate goes on to state that ''The Court cannot conclude that [Sweet], at 
any particular time, unilaterally denied Ms. Foreman her mandatory parenting time." Tr. 
8/8/2012, p. 202 LL 1-2. Given these favorable findings by the magistrate. Foreman's history of 
custodial interference, and the number of false or unsubstantiated allegations on Foreman's part, 
the district court should have determined that it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to 
then find that the majority of the problems between the parties were Sweet's fault. 
4. Was it an abuse of discretion not to award attorney fees pursuant to l.C. §12-121, 
where Foreman's denial of her waiver of child !inpport was not based in fact or in law, and 
where Sweet spent thousands trying to prove be did not owe the arrears? 
'The court has broad discretion to grant or deny attorney fees to the prevailing party. 
pursuant to I.C. §12-12L The provision is intended to grant prevailing litigants in civil actions 
the right to be made whole for attorney's fees and costs when justice so requires. 
'The denial of attorney fees was reversed in the matter of Straub v. Smith, supra, at 145 
Idaho 7L In that case the magistrate court believed that a prayer for costs and fees must be 
included in the pleadings, that Smiths had waived costs and fees, and that Smiths failed to cite a 
rule or basis for the motion. The Supreme Court held that the motion to reconsider pursuant to 
l.R.C.P. l l(a) should have been treated as a motion to amend the order of dismissal pursuant to 
I.R.C.P 59(e), and that Smiths supported their motion with an affidavit alerting the court to its 
factual error. Id. In this case, the magistrate gave no reason for denying fees and costs in its 
memorandum opinion and order. R Vol. I, p. 169. L. 3. Sweet filed a motion for attorney fees 
and costs after entry of the order, which was properly treated as a motion to reconsider. The 
magistrate denied reconsideration on the basis that Foreman's position was not frivolous, and that 
it was the Department of Health and Welfare who caused Sweet's child support problems. 
Sweet is clearly the prevailing party on the majority of the issues at trial. Sweet asked for 
modification of his child support dating back five years, and was granted relief. including a 
retroactive modification of his guidelines income for child support purposes. Most significantly, 
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Sweet proved that Foreman lied about the waiver, and about the use of his credit card. He 
proved that Foreman used his credit card without his knowledge or consent, and won an offset 
against his arrears as compensation. Foreman's position on these issues was frivolous and 
without factual or legal basis. 
Foreman asked for custody modification granting her full custody of SS, and was denied. 
Foreman moved for reconsideration and was denied, and again was denied on appeal before the 
district court Because the magistrate articulated clear and convincing reasons why it is in the 
best interests of SS to continue residing with his father on the fann in Bonner's Ferry, Foreman's 
continued litigation on that issue is frivolous, again without basis in fact or in law. 
Sweet does not contest issues in which he does not expect to prevail; Sweet did not ask 
for attorney fees litigating custody, even though he successfully defended against Foreman's 
attempt to take SS out of Idaho, and is, ultimately, the beneficiary of the modification. Sweet 
cannot prove that he is entitled to reimbursement regarding the counseling expense for SS, and 
the magistrate also denied compensation for the charges Foreman incurred on Sweet's cell phone. 
Those issues were not frivolous, encompassed a minute JX)rtion of the time at trial, and were not 
the cause of any pre-trial litigation. Sweet contests only the court's findings regarding the 
parties' income, the mileage penalty. and the denial of attorney fees, issues which are not 
frivolous, and on which he expects to prevail on appeal. 
Foreman's motion for reconsideration of the court's custody decision, on the other hand, 
was frivolous, not based in fact or in law, as was her appeal to the district court on that issue, and 
her present cross-appeal before the Supreme Court. Sweet should be compensated for his 
expense litigating the reconsideration of custody, and the review of that issue in the present 
appeal. Sweet should also be reimbursed for having to litigate the issue of whether or not 
Foreman had waived $9,080.00 in child support where she continued to deny the matter up to the 
moment of her testimony at trial of the matter. The Department of Health and Welfare Child 
Support Services had been subpoenaed, and were sending a caseworker to testify on Sweet's 
behalf; it was finally her new attorney, Tevis Hull, with a little guidance from the court, who 
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recognized the futility of Foreman's argument, and voluntarily entered a stipulation on the record 
to the effect that Sweet's allegation was true, and that the support at issue had been waived. Due 
to Foreman's capitulation, the court ordered a recess so that counsei could inform the caseworker 
that the testimony would not be needed. 
For two years, at the bottom of the recession, Sweet lost the use and the income derived 
from his commercial driver's license~ he lost the right to drive until he finally obtained custody, 
and, although the court refused to consider awarding child support to Sweet at that time, it did 
order that collection of child support cease. Order Ceasinc, Child Support 2/4/10 Case No. CV-
2006-il 8. 6 
Sweet was finally able to reverse the child support obligation that had been imposed on 
him by default in 2006, and to prove that he never owed the $9,080.00 arrears with which he was 
charged in 2008. He obtained a reduction in the income imputed to him, although he argues it 
should still be less. He was compensated for his stolen credit card. And, he obtained an award 
of child support, retroactive to 2010. Foreman's continued litigation against Sweet on those 
issues was frivolous, not based upon true facts, and not supported by Jaw. Sweet prevailed on 
those issues, and should have been av.--arded attorney foes. 
5. Was it an abuse of discretion not to award attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §12-123, 
where Foreman's request that the Department collect child support arrears was malicious 
and intended to harass or harm Sweet, and where her denial, for five years, of the waiver, 
was not based in fact or in law, and did in fact seriously harm and impair Sweet's ability to 
earn an income? 
At the conclusion of the hearing on Sweet's motion to reconsider, the magistrate 
commented that it was not Foreman, but the Department of Health and Welfare, who was 
responsible for Sweet's arrearnge, stating: "am I in a position to say that the way the Department 
of Health and Welfare is doing it is frivolous and therefore, to the extent that Ms. Foreman 
6 Sweet will move to augment the record with the Order Ceasing Child Support. 
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should have to pay attorney fees incurred to address that issue, I think that would be, in and of 
itself, quite a stretch." Tr. 3/25/2013 p. 32 LI. 16-19. The magistrate ignores the fact that 
Foreman herself denied the waiver, requested Child Support Services to collect $9,080.00 that 
Sweet did not owe, causing him to lose his commercial driver's license, and presented an 
unsubstantiated defense of duress and coercion on the day of trial, continuing to insist that Sweet 
owed the money until the falsity of her position became abundantly clear both to the court and to 
her counsel. Tr. 6/7/12, p. 38, LI. 4-8. 
Foreman told Sweet she waived support completely. Then, after two years had passed, 
she called the Department and requested they collect accumulated arrearages, causing him to lose 
his driver's license and his employment as a professional driver. If the Department mistook her 
intent, it would have been a simple matter for Foreman to correct the Department's error. lbe 
fact is that she did not do so, but instead persisted for five years: 
Q: Isn't it true that some of the child support arrears that are--that you 
requested to be collected from the Defendant [sic] were accrued during the time 
that he was living with you? 
A: I don't believe so. And there was the $3,000.00 that was forcibly--I 
was forced to sign off. 
Tr 6/7/2012, p. 36, LI. 4-8. In open court, Foreman admitted that her claims oflegai duress were 
baseless, and retracted her opposition to the waiver. Tr 6/7/2012, p. 38 LI. 23-25 p. 39 LL 1-7. 
She admitted that she contacted the department in September of 2008, and requested that the 
amount be collected from Sweet. Tr 6/7/2012, p. 42, LL 12-23. The court ordered a recess in 
order to allow counsel to inform the Department of Health and Welfare that they were no longer 
needed to testify. Tr 6/7/2012 p. 44 LL 4-15. Sweet prevailed on the issue, and proved that 
Foreman's opposition was groundless. The district court should have found that it was an abuse 
of discretion to deny attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-123. 
6. Should the court award attorney fees to Sweet pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 on appeal? 
An award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate when the appeal is brought or 
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delended frivolouslv. or without foundation. Cretchei v. Buder. 104 Idaho 7i9. 664 P.2d ·nu !CL 
App. 1983 ). In this case. Sweet has shown that the magistrate's findings ot tact are clearly 
erroneous, unsupported by substantial and competent evidence; and presents issues or taw mat 
require reversal of the trial court's orders on those issues. ~w"\!et shoulct prevan on ms appea1, 
and the Court should find that opposition to his appeal ts not based in tact or m law, and that ile 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. pursuant to LC. 12-12 l. Sweet should also 
prevail and be awarded attorney fees pursuant to LC. 12-121 against Foreman on her cross-
appeal, where she again asks the reviewing court to second-guess the tnal court m its custoay 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court should have found that the magistnue abused its discretion in its 
determinations regarding Sweet's guideiines income, which should have been imputed at the 
stipulated amount of $25,000.00 a year. Foreman should have been found to be underemployed. 
and her guidelines income should have been imputed at $70,000.00. The district court should 
have determined that it was clearly erroneous for the magistrate to compensate Foreman for an 
increase in mileage because there was none, and it was an abuse of discretion to impose the 
mileage requirement because it amounted to a criminal sanction without due process and because 
Sweet did not interfere with Foreman's parenting time. Sweet should have been awarded the 
attorney fees he requested for litigating the matter of child support as well as the matter of 
Foreman's waiver of child support, pursuant to LC. § i2-121, where Foreman's denial of her 
waiver, for five years. was frivolous and without basis; or, Sweet should have been awarded 
attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-123, where her request for collection of arrears that Sweet did 
not actually owe, was malicious and intended to harm and harass Sweet. 
WHEREFORE IT IS PRAYED that the Court reverse the district court's order affirming 
the magistrate court as to the income of the parties, the requirement that Sweet pay half 
Foreman's mileage, and the denial of attorney fees to Sweet as the prevailing party. The Court 
should order that Sweet's income be imputed at. $25,000.00, that Foreman's income be imputed at 
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$70,000.00. and that Foreman be ordered to pay attorney foes and costs, pursuant to I.C.§ 12-
121. in the present appeal. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2015 
\ ' 
' --\ 
Val Thornton. Attorney for Respondant/Cross-Appe1lam 
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